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PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS AS THING IN RE AND POST REM

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The problem of universals is by no means a new one, and it is a fundamental idea in medieval philosophy. Objects outside the mind are individual and many, whereas objects in the mind are single or universal.

What is universal? The universal is the general form, but the objects that exist outside our minds are single or particular and specific. What is specific in universals? How does the mind go about forming a universal concept? Is there anything outside the mind corresponding to the universal idea in the mind? A discussion on the problem of universals in terms was showed by Boethius and Porphyry. Medieval philosopher Ockham defined universals as humans are simply signs or names (hence nominalism) for designating these concepts that particular things engender in human reason. Human reason, then, is limited to the world of individual things. Ockham's view was genuinely empirical. According to him, the mind does not know anything more than individual things and their qualities even though the mind is able to use universal terms. Such terms are nothing more than terms or names for classes of individual things. Above all, universal terms do not refer to a realm of reality above or beyond the world of concrete individual things.

How did this view differ from Aquinas' treatment of the problem of universals? For the most part, Ockham's view was in harmony with what Aquinas had said, since Aquinas argued that universals are found in re, in particular things, and are abstracted from things post rem, after our experiences of them. Aquinas also accorded universals a metaphysical status when he said that they existed before individual things as ideas in the mind of God. These universals show like after rem.

Do universals exist in nature or only in the mind by Boethius? For him, they exist both in things and in the mind also, and they are immaterially or abstractly in the mind.

Another exaggerated realist was Guillaume de Chapeaux (1070 – 1121) who formulated two different views: first, in his identity theory, he held that the universal, say humanity, is identical in all members, in this case in all persons. The whole reality of the universe is contained in each person. Guillaume was forced by this and other criticism to adopt a second theory, that of indifferent, an antirealism view, in which he now argued that the individuals of a species are the same thing not through some coming essence but because in certain respects they are not different, they are indifferent.

Rossellini's realism also argued that the central argument was that only individuals exist in nature. Species and genera are not real things. A general term, a universal such as a word, does not refer to anything. It is only a word (voces), or a name (nomen), composed of letters and expressed as a vocal emission and therefore only air. The universal is therefore abstracted from the individual.

Thus, Ockham's nominalism separated faith and reason. The philosopher raised critical questions about the status of universal terms. The central question is whether such terms as humanity refer to any reality. The most famous term for him is humanity as substance.

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SUFFIXES -OS(IS), -IAS(IS)

IN TERMINOLOGICAL NAMES OF INTESTINAL DISEASES

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The leading direction of linguistic research of up-to-datenss is the analysis and description of terminological systems of various branches of knowledge.

The specificity of the formation of individual microsystems, putting into order and rate setting of terms, educational tools for terminological nomination, enriching the information and terminological sphere of any language, remain the priority areas of Ukrainian linguistic research.